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This article examines how property rights have informed the peoples’ right to resources in 
Article 1(2) of the Human Rights Covenants. It examines practice in the interpretation of Article 
1, as well as jurisprudence from the Inter-American and African human rights systems linking 
peoples’ rights and the right to property. It also highlights the pivotal role of protection of 
subsistence in making this connection. The right to resources can draw from different forms of 
property, including private, public, communal and traditional forms. Property rights under 
Article 1 have also applied to a range of communities, including indigenous peoples, 
subsistence farmers, traditional property owners, ethnic minorities, as well as the general 
population of a state. The common feature of these communities is their vulnerability in the 
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This article looks the expanding role of property rights in the interpretation of peoples’ rights 
in Article 1 of the Human Rights Covenants 1966 and the pivotal role that the protection of a 
people’s means of subsistence can play in this. While there is no specific human right to 
property in either Covenant – the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) – 
property rights have been used extensively in the application of Article 1. This is most relevant 
for the peoples’ right to dispose of their resources and not to be deprived of their means of 
subsistence in Article 1(2).1 This right, though, also forms part of the more general right of self-
determination2 in Article 1(1) by which peoples may freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.3 Much of this focus on property has been on the land rights of indigenous 
peoples, but property rights are relevant for the subsistence of different sections of a population, 
including subsistence farmers, minorities and women. 
The Covenants are unusual among human rights treaties in that neither proclaims the right to 
property, unlike regional instruments or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
1948. Article 1 cannot fill this gap. Its focus is fundamentally collective. The denial of an 
individual’s right to property does not in itself translate into the deprivation of a people’s right 
to resources, a position affirmed by the Human Rights Committee (HRC) in Hom v. Philippines 
                                                 
1 Common Article 1(2): “All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources 
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle 
of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.” 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 999 UNTS p. 171 (adopted 19 December 1966, entry 
into force 23 March 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, 993 UNTS p. 
3 (adopted 19 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976). 
2 See A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1995) pp. 55-56; A. A. Yusuf, ‘The Role that Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples can Play in the 
Current World Community’, in A. Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia (Oxford University Press, 2012) p. 388. 
3 Common Article 1(1): “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” supra note 1 
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in 2003.4 Nevertheless, peoples are groups composed of individuals with a relationship to that 
group, even if this is open to different interpretations. A peoples’ right to resources could be 
constructed from concepts of property within a group, whether by collectivising individual 
property rights, recognising traditional communal use or empowering state regulation and 
ownership of property. 
The peoples’ right to resources has often been treated as synonymous with state regulation of 
property as part of a right to permanent sovereignty. On this interpretation, peoples’ rights could 
restrict the human right to property. However, the reality is arguably more fluid. The right to 
resources in Article 1(2) certainly takes a collective perspective, but it also addresses private, 
public, communal and traditional forms of property from this position. A crucial nexus in 
linking these rights is the protection of a peoples’ means of subsistence. Subsistence provides 
an essential link between property rights, other human rights and peoples’ rights. This 
connection to subsistence has been most obvious and developed for indigenous peoples, but it 
is not specifically limited to them, as similar vulnerabilities can be shared by other parts of a 
state’s population. 
The development of a peoples’ right to resources in Article 1(2) has been undoubtedly been 
hampered by ambiguity over the concept of ‘peoples’. The HRC has considered the rights in 
Article 1, uniquely among rights in the ICCPR, not to be available for individual 
communication under the ICCPR Optional Protocol I.5 This marginalisation has led to the 
peoples’ right to resources being dubbed a “forgotten right”.6 Nonetheless, practice by the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has shown greater engagement 
with Article 1. This has been both in its observations on states’ reports and its apparent openness 
                                                 
4 Hom v. Philippines (2003) Communication No. 1169/2003, 30 July 2003, HRC, View, para. 4.2, 
http://juris.ohchr.org/Search/Details/1075, visited 24 September 2018. 
5 See, e.g., Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada (1990) Communication No. 167/1984, 
26 March 1990, HRC, View, para. 32.1, http://juris.ohchr.org/Search/Details/665, visited 24 September 2018. 




to communications under the ICESCR Optional Protocol if confined to economic, social and 
cultural aspects of self-determination.7 As a large proportion of communications to the HRC 
attempted under Article 1 have involved land and resources, it is likely that the CESCR will 
need to engage with property rights if it accepts communications under the article. 
This article will address the potential content of a peoples’ right to resources and its relationship 
with property rights and subsistence. It will first outline the basic content of a human right to 
property and its relationship with other rights. Second, it will look at how private, communal 
and public property can inform peoples’ rights and their significance for Article 1(2). Third, it 
will examine how peoples’ rights, protection of subsistence and the right to property have 
interacted in the Inter-American and African human rights systems. Lastly, it will look at the 
influence of property rights on the peoples’ right to resources in Article 1, focussing on 
indigenous peoples, the general population, subsistence farmers and traditional land owners, 
and minorities. This examination draws on states’ reporting on their obligations under Article 
18 and observations by the CESCR and HRC9 as indicators of subsequent practice in the 
interpretation of this article. It is argued that a peoples’ right to resources paired with protection 
of subsistence addresses different vulnerable sections of a state’s population through protection 
of property rights. 
 
 
2. The Human Right to Property in International Law 
 
                                                 
7 See Comments by Mr. Simma, Ceausu and Alston (Chair), UN Doc. E/C.12/1996/SR.46/Add.1, paras. 43-47. 
8 Relevant for the interpretation of Article 1 under Article 31(3)(b) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
1969. See G. Nolte, Second Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the 
Interpretation of Treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/671, pp. 21-24, paras. 44-48. 
9 The relevance of committee practice was recognised in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Democratic Republic 
of Congo) 30 November 2010, ICJ, Judgment, para. 66, <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/103/judgments>, visited 
24 September 2018. 
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The human right to property is widely established in different instruments. At treaty level, it is 
proclaimed in several regional human rights systems: in Europe in Article 1 of Protocol I to the 
European Convention on Human Rights 1950;10 in the Americas in Article 21 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights 1969;11 and in Africa in Article 14 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights 1981.12 These systems have complaints procedures which have 
allowed this right to develop in jurisprudence. The right is also recognised in the Arab Charter 
on Human Rights 2004,13 which is limited to reporting obligations, and the non-binding 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 2012.14 Alongside these regional human rights systems, 
the right to property and the prevention of its arbitrary deprivation is proclaimed in Article 17 
of the formally non-binding UDHR.15 
The formulation of the right to property varies between those instruments, which in part reflects 
different historical, economic and social contexts.16 Indigenous property claims, which have 
been important in linking the human right to property and peoples’ rights have been much more 
significant in the Americas, and to a degree Africa, than in Europe. Correspondingly, this article 
focusses more on the Inter-American and African systems than the European. Nonetheless, 
three common elements can be identified. 
First, the concept of ‘property’ in the instruments has been interpreted broadly to encompass 
not just physical property, but also economic interests and rights.17 Second, while the human 
                                                 
10 Article 1, Protocol I to the European Convention on Human Rights 1952 (adopted 20 March 1952, entered into 
force 18 May 1954).  
11 Article 21, American Convention on Human Rights 1960 (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 
July 1978). 
12 Article 14, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 (adopted 1 June 1981, entered into force 21 
October 1986). 
13 Article 31, Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004 (adopted 23 May 2004, entered into force 15 March 2008).  
14 Principle 17, ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 2012 (adopted 18 November 2012).  
15 Article 17, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, annexed to General Assembly Resolution 217 (III), 10 
December 1948, UN Doc. A/RES/217(III)A. 
16 J. E. Alvarez, The Human Right of Property (New York University School of Law Public Law and Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 18-21, March 2018) pp. 60-61. 
17 Abrill Alosilla et al. v. Peru, 4 March 2011, IACtHR, Judgment, para. 82, 
<http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_223_ing.pdf>, visited 22 September 2018; Centre for 
Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of the Endorois Welfare 
Council v. Kenya (‘Endorois’), Communication No. 276/2003, 25 November 2009, ACHPR, paras. 186-189, 
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right to property often has an individual focus, it has supported collective interpretations in 
particular contexts. Third, the right is a relative one, subject to restrictions in the public interest. 
The least developed framework for these restrictions is found in Article 17(2) of the UDHR, 
which simply provides that: “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”  The Inter-
American, African and European instruments contain more specific limitations. All three 
require restrictions to be prescribed by law18 and have a public purpose.19 Jurisprudence from 
these systems also shows that the limits must be proportionate to their aims20 and include 
compensation, with ‘adequate’ providing a common standard.21 (Article 21(2) of the American 
Convention provides for “just” compensation, which has been interpreted as ‘prompt, adequate 
and effective’).22 The notion of ‘adequate’ itself leaves bodies discretion on the amount and 
form of compensation.23 For example, the Inter-American Court in Salvador Chiriboga v. 
Ecuador considered that it included “the trade value of the property … and, the fair balance 
between the general interest and the individual interest.”24 This starts from the market value 
but allows the context to affect the valuation. 
                                                 
<http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/46th/comunications/276.03/achpr46_276_03_eng.pdf>, visited 22 
September 2018; Bramelid and Malmström v. Sweden, Applications Nos. 8588/79 and 8589/79, 12 October 1982, 
ECHR, p. 81, <file://lancs/homes/04/summersj/Downloads/BRAMELID%20v.%20SWEDEN.pdf>, visited 22 
September 2018. 
18 Beyeler v. Italy, Application No. 33202/96, 5 January 2000, ECtHR, Judgment, para. 109, 
<https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2233202/96%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-58832%22]}>, 
visited 22 September 2018; Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador, 6 May 2008, ACtHR, Judgment, para. 63, 
<http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_179_ing.pdf>, visited 22 September 2018; Endorois, supra 
note 17, para. 219. 
19 Beyeler v. Italy, supra note 18, para. 111; Chiriboga v. Ecuador, supra note 18, para. 63; Endorois, supra note 
17, paras. 212-213. 
20 Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium, Application No. 17849/91, 20 November 1995, ECtHR, 
Judgement, para. 38, 
<https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2217849/91%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-58168%22]}>, 
visited 22 September 2018; Chiriboga v. Ecuador, supra note 18, para. 63; Endorois, supra note 17, para. 214. 
21 Holy Monasteries v. Greece, Application No. 13092/87; 13984/88, 9 December 1994, ECtHR Judgment, para. 
71, <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2213984/88%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-
57906%22]}>, visited 22 September 2018; Dino Noca v. D. R. Congo, Communication No. 286/2004, 22 October 
2012, ACHPR, para. 143, 
<http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/52nd/comunications/286.04/achpr52_286_04_eng.pdf>, visited 22 
September 2018. 
22 Chiriboga v. Ecuador, supra note 18, para. 96. 
23 Alvarez, supra note 16, pp. 38, 76. 
24 Chiriboga v. Ecuador, supra note 18, para. 98. See also James v. UK, Application No. 8793/79, 21 February 
1986, ECtHR, Judgment, para. 54, 
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The right to property can also be found in the national laws of almost every state. A 2014 study 
by John Spranking found that: “95% of the 193 states which are members of the United Nations 
guarantee the right to property, most commonly by language embedded in the national 
constitution.”25 In addition, most of these provisions not only recognised an abstract right but 
also addressed its content and conditions for its restriction.26 Nonetheless, the specific 
formulation of those rights still varied between states and the prevention of arbitrary 
deprivation of property in Article 17 of the UDHR was seen as a common denominator.27 The 
concept of ‘arbitrary’ deprivation in the UDHR is not defined and provides a minimum standard 
due to the failure to agree on more specific conditions. Nonetheless, it may include failure to 
provide compensation or a discriminatory intent.28 
Widespread international and domestic recognition has supported claims that the right to 
property is part of custom.29 A customary right has been seen to be developing from the 1990s, 
with greater acceptance of property rights following the collapse of communism.30  Such a right 
received strong recognition from the EU Court of First Instance in Kadi in 2005, which found 
that the arbitrary deprivation of property violated jus cogens.31 Nonetheless, differences in 
content between states and human rights systems over the conditions of inference may limit the 
scope of custom to arbitrary deprivation.32 
                                                 
<https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%228793/79%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-57507%22]}>, 
visited 22 September 2018 
25 J. G. Sprankling, ‘The Global Right to Property’, 52 CJTL (2014) p. 484. 
26 Ibid., p. 489. 
27 Ibid., p. 488. 
28 C. Krause and G. Alfredsson, ‘Article 17’, in G. Alfredsson and A. Eide (eds.), The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1999) p. 364; Alvarez, supra note 16, p. 67. 
29 Sprankling, supra note 25, pp. 464-505. 
30 See L. Valencia Rodríguez, The Right of Everyone to Own Property Alone as well as in Association with Others, 
23 November 1993, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/19, p. 22, para. 97. 
31 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission, Case T-315/01, 21 September 2005, CJEU, Judgment, para. 
242, < http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?docid=65739&doclang=en>, visited 22 September 2018. 
32 Alvarez, supra note 16, p. 97; Sprankling, supra note 25, p. 499. 
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There is also a broader connection with other human rights. While there is no right to property 
in the Covenants, the effects of a denial of such rights have been addressed by the CESCR.33 A 
crucial benefit of the right to property is that it provides individuals with security of tenure. 
(Security of tenure is a broader concept than property ownership and can include the rights of 
tenants in rented accommodation or informal settlements).34 It also allows access to land for 
agriculture and access to business property, enabling people to secure a livelihood. As such, it 
underpins rights to life,35 food36 and health,37 which form basic elements of subsistence. 
Moreover, its impact goes further than mere physical survival.38 General comments by the HRC 
on persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities39 and the by CESCR on the 
right to culture40 have both emphasised the significance of protecting land and resources in 
ensuring the way of life and cultural identity of indigenous communities. 
 
 
3. The Right of Peoples to Dispose of their Resources in Article 1 
 
The relationship between the right to property and other human rights can inform the peoples’ 
right to dispose of their resources. Peoples are ultimately groups of individuals. The rights of 
those individuals, in turn, could shape the rights that peoples exercise collectively. However, 
as there is no single definition of a ‘people’, the relationship between individuals, property 
rights and peoples’ rights varies according to different theories.  
                                                 
33 CESCR General Comment No. 4, 1 January 1992, UN Doc. E/1992/23, para. 9; I.D.G. v. Spain, Communication 
No. 2/2014, 17 June 2015, CESCR, View, para. 11.1, <http://juris.ohchr.org/Search/Details/2010>, visited 22 
September 2018. 
34 J. G. Sprankling, The International Law of Property (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) p. 125. 
35 CESCR General Comment No. 7, 20 May 1997, UN Doc E/1998/22, Annex IV, para. 4. 
36 CESCR General Comment No. 12, 12 May 1999, E/C.12/1999/5, paras. 13 and 15. 
37 CESCR General Comment No. 14, 11 August 2000, E/C.12/2000/4, para. 43. 
38 On the physical and cultural value of land see J. Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International 
Law (Second Edition), (Brill, Leiden, 2016), pp. 178-209. 
39 HRC General Comment No. 23, 26 April 1994, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/REV.1/Add,5, para. 7. 
40 CESCR General Comment No. 21, 21 December 2009, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/21, para. 36. 
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There are three notable approaches to the relationship between individuals and peoples, each 
with different implications for the link between the right to property and peoples’ rights. First, 
a people could be defined as the whole population of a state, with peoples’ rights as a sum of 
the human rights enjoyed by that population. This reflects a classic liberal approach to a people, 
as a community united by shared rights.41 This has been prominent historically in the American 
and French revolutions, where property rights underpinned self-government,42 and can be seen 
in contemporary reports on Article 1 of the Covenants.43 The direct extension of peoples’ rights 
from human rights can also be seen in the practice of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.44  In COHRE v. Sudan (2009), for example, the Commission identified a 
violation of the peoples’ right to development based on “a massive violation of not only the 
economic, social and cultural rights, but other individual rights of the Darfurian people.”45 
These rights included property. This approach aligns peoples’ rights with the right to property 
and means that legitimate restrictions for a public purpose on the latter right also apply. 
Protection of subsistence in this context emphasises the scale of individual human rights 
violations to the point where they impact on peoples’ rights. 
Second, peoples’ rights could relate to the property rights of a community. Communal property 
rights have been identified for indigenous peoples and other communites. One of the main 
theories to support these rights is communitarian liberalism,46 which sees certain rights, 
                                                 
41 See J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, P. Laslett (eds.), (Second Edition) (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1967) bk. II, ch XI, s. 139, ch. XIII, s. 149 and ch. XIX, s. 222. 
42 See Article 1, Virginia Declaration of Rights 1776; Articles 3 and 17, Declaration on the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen 1789. 
43 See, e.g., Lebanon: “The economic system is free and guarantees private initiative, the right to private property 
and the balanced development of regions”. Third Periodic Report 2016, UN Doc. CCPR/C/LBN/3, para. 8. 
44 Kevin Mgwanga Gunme v. Cameroon, Communication No. 266/2003, 27 May 2009, ACHPR, paras. 176 and 
178, <http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/45th/comunications/266.03/achpr45_266_03_eng.pdf>, visited 22 
September 2018. 
45 COHRE v. Sudan, Communication Nos. 279/03 and 296/05, 27 May 2009, ACHPR, para, 224, 
<http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/45th/comunications/279.03-296.05/achpr45_279.03_296.05_eng.pdf>, 
visited 22 September 2018. 
46 Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993) pp. 72-76; J. Raz and A. Margalit, 
‘National Self-Determination’ in J. Raz (eds.), Ethics in the Public Domain (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994) pp. 
110-130; A. E. Buchanan, ‘Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism’ 99 Ethics (1989) pp. 852-882. 
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especially culture, as inherently linked to group membership, requiring the protection of a 
group to realise individual rights. This could support collective rights or a collective context on 
rights and even allows those rights to conflict with individual ones in certain cases. This 
approach can be seen in the communal interpretation of the right to property in Article 21 of 
the American Convention and Article 14 of the African Charter. It is also reflected in the right 
of persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities in Article 27 of the ICCPR, 
which situates individual rights in a group context and can also address property rights. 
However, the potential for conflict with individual rights is problematic from a liberal 
perspective.47 It is significant that communal interpretations of property rights have not simply 
been justified by a community’s culture, but the necessity of that property for their physical 
and cultural survival.48 This is a more serious test and can set tangible limits on property 
ownership. It also puts subsistence in a pivotal position, as it is the protection of subsistence 
that justifies this interpretation. 
Communal property rights can also be expressed though distinct peoples’ rights, such as Article 
1 of the Covenants or Article 21 of the African Charter. As distinct peoples’ rights, they could 
draw from nationalism and the right of nations to control their resources, which, if applied 
within states, is likely to be seen by states as an existential threat to their integrity. 
Correspondingly, while communal property can be supported under peoples’ rights, those 
rights have been tied to a communitarian liberal formula that is somewhat safer for states, with 
the same limits as collectively interpreted rights. This also means that these rights are subject 
to legitimate restrictions for a public purpose like individual property rights. 
Third, peoples could be defined collectively as the whole population of a state, with peoples’ 
rights effectively equating to states’ rights. This corresponds with a state-based economic 
                                                 
47 A. Buchanan, ‘The Role of Collective Rights in the Theory of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights’ 3 TransnatlL & 
Contemp Probs (1993) pp. 91-92, 95. 
48 See S. Wiessner, ‘The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples’, 22 EJIL (2011) p. 129. 
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nationalism that seeks to construct a national economy through methods like public ownership 
of resources and regulation of economic activity.49 This remains important for states and was 
particularly prominent during post-war decolonisation and the New International Economic 
Order (NIEO) of the 1970s.50 The content of this peoples’ right varies according to the ideology 
of public ownership or regulation behind it. However, aligning peoples with states establishes 
a potentially contrary relationship with the right to property, supporting restrictions on it. These 
peoples’ rights have been called “statist” for this reason.51 However, it can be noted that state 
action in economic nationalism is not ultimately judged by its benefit to the state but to the 
nation or people behind it.52 This is underlined, for example, in Principle 1 of the Declaration 
on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources, GA Res. 1803(XVII) 1962: 
“The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being 
of the people of the State concerned”.53 This differentiates people from a state and allows for 
subsistence to be positioned as protection if a government acts against the basic rights of a 
people. 
Article 1(2) proclaims the right of peoples to dispose of their resources in a complex and 
somewhat ambiguous balance of five elements that can potentially encompass each perspective 
on property. The first four elements of the right in Article 1(2) relate to an inter-state context 
and a defence of states’ rights as peoples’ rights. Peoples have a right to “freely dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources”, subject to “obligations arising out of international economic co-
                                                 
49 See R. Gilpin The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987) p. 
31; R. Abdelal, National Purpose in the World Economy (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2005) p. 151; S. Pryke, 
‘Economic Nationalism: Theory, History and Prospects’ 3 Global Policy (2012) pp. 282-285. 
50 See H. S. Zakariya, ‘Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the Search for a New International Order’, in K. 
Hossain (ed.), Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order (Frances Pinter, New York, 1980) pp. 208-
219.  
51 N. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997) pp. 370-371; 
E. Duruigbo, ‘Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of Natural Resources in International Law’, 38 
Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. (2006) p. 50. 
52 See Yusuf, supra note 2, p. 389. 
53 General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), 14 December 1962, UN Doc. A/RES/1803(XVII) (1962). 
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operation” and “international law”, though these are based on “mutual benefit”.54 This structure 
derives from the drafting of Article 1. This took place from 1952-1955 driven by post-war 
decolonisation and the aspiration of newly independent states to have greater control of their 
economies. Those states saw the Article as an opportunity to challenge relations with 
industrialised states and foreign investors and correspondingly was resisted by those states. The 
first part of paragraph 2 struck a balance with sufficient ambiguity in its terms to satisfy both 
groups of states.55 
The final sentence in Article 1(2), though, pointed to a broader relationship. Regardless of 
states’ commitments, peoples were not to be placed in a situation in which they were deprived 
of their means of subsistence. The concept of subsistence was never defined and few examples 
were given. However, one of the clearest understandings came from the representative of Saudi 
Arabia: “It was intended to prevent a weak or penniless government from seriously 
compromising a country’s future by granting concessions in the economic sphere – a frequent 
occurrence in the nineteenth century.”56 This again took an inter-state context, while 
emphasising the need for a state to act for the benefit of its people. However, another example 
from El Salvador of a tribe in Tanganyika removed from their ancestral land57 indicated that 
subsistence could include communities in their relations with a state, albeit in a colonial 
context.  
The drafting of Article 1 was part of a wider movement in the General Assembly to rebalance 
economic relations through peoples’ rights. Initial drafts of Article 1(2) promoted a right to 
“permanent sovereignty” over resources. The phrase was dropped in the drafting process,58 but 
outside the confines of treaty-making, the Assembly could develop the concept further. It was 
                                                 
54 Peru, Third Periodic Report 1995, UN Doc. CCPR/C/83/Add.1, para. 11. 
55 See D. McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) p. 15; J. Summers, Peoples 
and International Law (2nd Edition), (Nijhoff, Leiden, 2014) pp. 344-355. 
56 Saudi Arabia, 25 November 1955, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.672, para. 36. 
57 El Salvador, 28 November 1955, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.674, para. 8. 
58 Schrijver, supra note 51 pp. 49-53. 
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expressed most famously in the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty of 1962, which was 
primarily focussed on the relationship between peoples/states and foreign investors.59 Later 
instruments, such as the General Assembly’s Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States 
(the NIEO Charter) 1974 simply referred to the right as one of states.60  
The tension from this interpretation of the peoples’ right to resources, as well as a lack of 
agreement on property rights at the time worked against the inclusion of a right to property in 
either Covenant.61 Nonetheless, a state-orientated interpretation of Article 1(2) was neither 
exclusive nor fixed. The concept of peoples underpinning Article 1(2) and its loose balance of 
rights and obligations ensured an inherent fluidity. By the time the Covenants entered into force 
in 1976 decolonisation was drawing to a close and practice over Article 1 was shifting to the 
relationship between a state and its people.  
There have been two elements behind this greater internal focus. First, the protection of means 
of subsistence highlighted the position of vulnerable sections within states’ populations. A 
notable example is the CESCR’s General Comment No. 15 (2002) on the right to water, which 
identified adequate access to water for subsistence farmers and indigenous peoples as essential 
for subsistence under Article 1(2).62  
Second, states themselves in their reports have referred to the different roles of property rights 
in defining a peoples’ right to resources. Instead of mapping on to states’ rights, the peoples’ 
right to property in Article 1(2) has been seen to encompass a range of public, private and 
communal property rights. Moreover, despite the potential for conflict, these rights can co-exist 
within delimited roles. An example is provided by El Salvador in its Second and Third-Fifth 
                                                 
59 T. R. G. van Banning, The Human Right to Property (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2002) pp. 45, 154-155; S. K. 
Banerjee, ‘The Concept of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources – An Analysis’, 8 Ind. J.I.L. (1968) p. 
516. 
60 Article 2(1), Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States, General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX), 
12 December 1974, UN Doc. A/RES/3281(XXIX) (1974). 
61 Van Banning, supra note 59, p. 43. W. A. Schabas, ‘The Omission of the Right to Property in the International 
Covenants’, 4 Hague Y.I.L. (1991) p. 158-159.   
62 CESCR General Comment No. 15, 20 January 2003, E/C.12/2002/11, para. 7. 
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Periodic Reports to the CESCR in which it reported on private property, state ownership of 
subsoil and indigenous land tenure all under Article 1(2).63 
 
4. The Interaction between Peoples’ Rights and the Right to Property in Inter-American 
and African Jurisprudence 
 
Some of the most significant practice connecting peoples’ rights and the right to property has 
come from the Inter-American and African human rights systems. Their jurisprudence is 
significant not only because of the way in which the two rights have informed each other, but 
because this linkage has drawn from Article 1 of the Covenants. Peoples’ rights have shaped 
the human right to property in the Inter-American system and that right, in turn, has defined the 
peoples’ right to resources in the African Charter. Protection of subsistence has been pivotal to 
this. 
The regional Inter-American human rights system does not recognise any specific peoples’ 
rights. Nevertheless, these rights have been influential in developing a communal interpretation 
of the right to property in Article 21 of the American Convention in an indigenous and tribal 
context. Article 21 does not explicitly advance communal property. This interpretation for 
indigenous and tribal peoples by the Inter-American Court in Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. 
Nicaragua in 2001 was seen as an evolution64 that needed additional support. In this decision 
and later cases the Court found two distinct foundations for this interpretation. The first related 
to the subsistence of the community, expressed as its physical and cultural survival. The second 
involved additional rights outside the American Convention in national law and other 
international instruments. 
                                                 
63 El Salvador, Second Periodic Report 2004, UN Doc. E/1990/6/Add.39, paras. 28 and 31 and Third-Fifth Periodic 
Report 2011, UN Doc. E/C.12/SLV/3-5, para. 17. 
64 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 31 August 2001, IACtHR, Judgment, para. 148, 
<http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_79_ing.pdf>, visited 22 September 2018. 
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The survival of the community, a term the Court treated as interchangeable with 
“subsistence”,65 fundamentally underpinned communal property rights. Communal property 
was not just based on the cultural traditions of a community, but its necessity for its physical 
and cultural survival and transmission of its culture to future generations.66  
This revealed three closely interconnected aspects to survival. First, it involved the land and 
resources necessary for the physical integrity of an indigenous community, such as food, water, 
housing and medicinal plants.67 Second, it involved not just physical existence, but also the 
cultural integrity of a group68 and a connection to land and resources, defined not only by 
physical needs but spiritual ties69 and access to sacred sites.70 Third, this physical and cultural 
integrity was viewed inter-generationally, with rights to land and resources being based on their 
traditional use “for centuries”,71 and their preservation necessary for the transmission of culture 
to future generations.72 The test of necessity for physical and cultural survival meant that rights 
over land also included natural resources found on the land on which a group depended.73 
However, while this necessity could support rights over those resources, it could also limit 
them. In Saramaka v. Suriname (2007) gold was not considered essential to that people’s 
                                                 
65 See, e.g., Saramaka: “[T]he forests within Saramaka territory provide a home for the various animals they hunt 
for subsistence, and it is where they gather fruits and other resources essential for their survival… In this sense, 
wood-logging activities in the forest would also likely affect such subsistence resources. That is, the extraction of 
one natural resource is most likely to affect the use and enjoyment of other natural resources that are necessary for 
the survival of the Saramakas.” Saramaka People v. Suriname, 28 November 2007, IACtHR, Judgment, para. 90, 
<http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_172_ing.pdf>, visited 22 September 2018.  
66 Ibid., para. 126; Awas Tingni, supra note 64, para. 149; Moiwana Community v. Suriname, 15 June 2005, 
IACtHR, Judgment, para. 131 <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_124_ing.pdf>, visited 22 
September 2018; Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 17 June 2005, IACtHR, Judgment, para. 131, 
<http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_125_ing.pdf>, visited 22 September 2018; Kichwa 
Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, 27 June 2012, IACtHR, Judgment, paras. 146-155, 
<http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/asuntos/sarayaku_20_01_12_ing.pdf>, visited 22 September 2018; Kaliña and 
Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, 25 November 2015, IAtCHR, Judgment, paras. 151-152, 164-167, 
<http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_309_ing.pdf>, visited 22 September 2018. 
67 See Yakye Axa, supra note 66, para. 168;  
68 Ibid., para. 135. 
69 Kichwa, supra note 66, para. 155. 
70 Kaliña and Lokono, supra note 66, paras. 130, 167. 
71 Saramaka, supra note 65, para. 121. 
72 Yakye Axa, supra note 66, para. 154. 
73 “[T]he right to use and enjoy the territory would be meaningless for indigenous and tribal communities if that 
right were not connected to the protection of natural resources in the territory.” Kichwa, supra note 66, para. 146. 
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culture, though the process of its extraction impacted on a vital resource for their survival, 
water, which required consultation.74 
In relation to Article 21, physical and cultural survival determined the balance between the 
right to property and legitimate restrictions. As communal rights necessarily required 
community decision-making, proportionality included standards for consultation: being timely, 
conducted in good faith with the aim to achieve consent, respect for indigenous institutions, 
and informed by social and environmental impact assessment.75 Compensation expanded to 
encompass benefit-sharing. Physical and cultural survival defined proportionality as the 
necessary safeguard for protecting a community’s means of subsistence.76  
In addition, the Court relied on external provisions on indigenous land rights. Article 29(b) of 
the American Convention provided that its interpretation should not restrict other rights. The 
Court used this Article to import standards from national laws and international instruments, 
notably ILO Convention 16977 and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP).78 Many of these provisions were based on self-determination. Communal property 
rights in the Nicaraguan Constitution cited in Awas Tingni were grounded in a general reference 
to self-determination.79 Rights to land and resources in UNDRIP were also seen as an 
expression of this right.80 ILO Convention 169 had a more difficult relationship as the 
                                                 
74 Saramaka, supra note 65, para. 155. 
75 Ibid., paras. 129 and 133. 
76 Ibid., paras. 129-132. 
77 Yakye Axa, supra note 66, paras. 126-127; Kichwa, supra note 66, paras. 161, 163. See L. Lixinski, ‘Treaty 
Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of 
International Law’, 21 EJIL (2010) p. 587. 
78 Kaliña and Lokono, supra note 66, para. 202. 
79 Awas Tingni, supra note 64, paras. 116 and 153. 
80 S. Errico, ‘The Controversial Issue of Natural Resources: Balancing States’ Sovereignty with Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights’, in S. Allen and A. Xanthaki (eds.), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (Hart, Oxford, 2011) p. 364. 
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Convention distinguished indigenous peoples from ‘peoples’ in international law,81 though ILO 
experts have considered the instrument to express aspects of self-determination.82 
The Court also specifically engaged with self-determination citing Article 1 of the Covenants, 
together with Article 27 of the ICCPR. These Articles were raised in cases involving Suriname, 
which was not party to ILO Convention 169 but had ratified the two Covenants. In Saramaka 
v. Suriname the Court derived a communal interpretation of the right to property from the two 
Covenant articles: 
 
[T]he right to property protected under Article 21 of the American Convention, 
interpreted in light of the rights recognized under common Article 1 and Article 27 of the 
ICCPR, which may not be restricted in interpreting the American Convention, grants to 
the members of the Saramaka community the right to enjoy property in accordance with 
their communal tradition.83 
 
Common Article 1 provided the primary basis for establishing a collective interpretation of 
property rights. (Article 27 was positioned in a secondary role.) The Court cited CESCR 
practice that applied the Article to indigenous and tribal peoples, enabling them to “freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development”, “freely dispose of their natural wealth 
and resources” and not to be “deprived of [their] own means of subsistence”.84  
                                                 
81 Article 1(3), ILO Convention 169 (adopted 27 June 1986, entry into force 5 September 1991), 
<https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C169>, visited 
24 September 2018. 
82 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights in Practice: A Guide to ILO Convention No. 169 (International Labour 
Standards Department 2009) pp. 25-26. 
83 Saramaka, supra note 65, para. 95. 
84 Ibid., para. 93. 
18 
 
The influence of the Article was even more substantial in Kaliña and Lokono v. Suriname 
(2015), with the Court the framing the right to property on the same terms as self-determination 
in Article 1(1) of the Covenants:  
 
[A]n interpretation of Article 21 of the American Convention that requires recognition of 
the right of the members of indigenous and tribal peoples to freely determine and enjoy 
their own social, cultural and economic development, which includes the right to enjoy 
their particular spiritual relationship with the territory they have traditionally used and 
occupied.85 
 
However, there was a crucial difference between this phrasing and the right in Article 1. While 
this communal interpretation of Article 21 was couched in the terminology of self-
determination, the right was still held by members of indigenous and tribal peoples, rather than 
peoples themselves. This was a hybrid individual-collective structure rather than a purely 
collective right. The potential for conflict between the communal right to property and 
individual property rights was also recognised. The Court asserted that neither right prima facie 
could take priority and any dispute between the two needed to be resolved on a case by case 
basis.86 However, the necessary connection between communal property and the survival of a 
group does suggest a greater weight behind the communal right.87 
While peoples’ rights in Inter-American jurisprudence supported a communal interpretation of 
property rights, in the African system this interplay was inverted – property rights defined the 
content of peoples’ rights, specifically the peoples’ right to resources. The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights contains both a right to property in Article 14 and a peoples’ right 
                                                 
85 Kaliña and Lokono, supra note 66, para. 124.  
86 Ibid., paras. 155-157. 
87 See Yakye Axa, supra note 66, paras. 146-149. 
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to resources in Article 21. The African Commission and the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights in their jurisprudence established an intimate connection between these rights, 
with the Commission relying heavily on Inter-American jurisprudence to do so. American cases 
supported a communal interpretation of Article 14 of the African Charter, which was directly 
extended to Article 21. 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights had earlier addressed the peoples’ 
right to resources in SERAC v. Nigeria [‘Ogoniland’] in 2001. In this decision, the Commission 
effectively constructed a peoples’ right to resources from multiple violations of individual 
rights directed at the Ogoni ethnic group.88 Article 21 was treated as a collectivisation of 
individual rights.  
However, subsequent Inter-American jurisprudence allowed the Commission in the Centre for 
Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council) v. Kenya [‘Endorois’] in 2009 to take a new approach based on the right to 
property. The Commission utilised Inter-American jurisprudence on Article 21 of the American 
Convention as a template for translating the right to property in Article 14 of the Charter into 
the right to resources in Article 21. According to the Commission: 
 
The American Convention does not have an equivalent of the African Charter’s Article 
21 on the Right to Natural Resources. It therefore reads the right to natural resources into 
the right to property (Article 21 of the American Convention), and in turn applies similar 
limitation rights on the issue of natural resources as it does on limitations of the right to 
property.89 
                                                 
88 Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria 
[‘Ogoniland’], Communication No. 155/96, 27 October 2001, ACHPR, paras. 55-58, 
<http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/30th/comunications/155.96/achpr30_155_96_eng.pdf>, visited 22 
September 2018. 




The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights also addressed the right to resources in 
Article 21 in Ogiek Community v. Kenya in 2017, though without any reliance on Inter-
American jurisprudence. Nonetheless, the Court followed the same approach as the 
Commission, with a right to property providing the blueprint for the right to resources. In 
particular, after dividing the right to property according to three traditional elements of property 
ownership (usus, fructus, abusus), the Court simply transferred those elements into the right to 
resources without any change of context.90  
The text of Article 21 proclaims a right to freely dispose of resources, not just land, and the 
Commission in Endorois asserted that this was vested in an indigenous people. However, the 
Commission was also quick to qualify this by endorsing the approach to resources in Saramaka 
(with rubies instead of gold) and quoting the legitimate restrictions on property in Article 14.91 
This seemed to pull back from a distinctive peoples’ right to resources in favour of an 
equivalence with communal property under Article 14.  
In Endorois, the touchstone for a communal interpretation of Article 1492 and the peoples’ right 
to resources in Article 2193 was physical and cultural survival identified by the Inter-American 
Court and again equated with subsistence.94 Restrictions on the right in Article 21 were 
imported straight from Article 14, “the two-pronged test of ‘in the interest of public need or in 
the general interest of the community’ and ‘in accordance with appropriate laws’”,95 though 
limits from the American Convention were also relied on.96 These restrictions were subject to 
                                                 
90 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Kenya [‘Ogiek Community’], Application No. 006/2012, 
26 May 2017, ACtHPR, Judgment, para. 201, <http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/56-pending-cases-
details/864-app-no-006-2012-african-commission-on-human-and-peoples-rights-v-republic-of-kenya-details>, 
visited 22 September 2018. 
91 Endorois, supra note 17, paras. 266-268. 
92 Ibid., paras. 197 and 212. 
93 Ibid., paras. 260 and 261. Citing the Yakye Axa and Sawhoyamaxa cases. 
94 Ibid., paras. 287-288. 
95 Ibid., para. 267. 
96 Ibid., paras. 256 and 265. 
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proportionality, which in the context of survival could raise the threshold for interference for 
both Article 1497 and Article 21.98 Likewise, as both rights involved communal interests, 
proportionality required consultation, modelled for both Articles 14 and 21 on the standards in 
Saramaka.99 The compensation element in proportionality, again citing Saramaka, was 
expanded into a requirement for benefit-sharing in both articles.100  
A critical though controversial element in a consultation process is the extent to which it 
depends on consent. Here the text of Article 21 could potentially deviate from Article 14 as it 
includes a specific standard. Article 21(2) provides that in cases of spoilation, dispossessed 
people have a right to the lawful recovery of lost property and compensation. This suggested 
that communities did not have a veto over interference with their resources but were entitled to 
reparation if this took place. However, this corresponded with Article 14, in which the object 
of consultation was to “seek consent – or to compensate”.101 Consent for both Articles was a 
goal but not a veto. 
Endorois broke down any significant barrier between the communal interpretation of the right 
to property and a peoples’ right to resources. The unfortunate consequence, however, was that 
it left the peoples’ right to resources effectively duplicative, without an obvious independent 
content or contribution. This relationship was affirmed by the African Court in Ogiek 
Community, which held that “so far as” the property rights of the community had been breached 
under Article 14, the respondent state had also violated Article 21.102 
African jurisprudence is also significant for a building a connection between the rights to 
property and resources beyond an indigenous context. While the Commission in Endorois 
relied heavily on Inter-American jurisprudence in an indigenous or tribal context, it also drew 
                                                 
97 Ibid., paras. 212-216. 
98 Ibid., para. 256. 
99 Ibid., paras. 227-228, 266-268. 
100 Ibid., paras. 225-228 and 266. 
101 Ibid., para. 226. 
102 Ogiek Community, supra note 90, para. 201. 
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more broadly from the European Court of Human Rights on traditional property. In particular, 
it cited Doğan v. Turkey (2004), which upheld descent-based property ownership, and 
communal rights to grazing and tree-felling for Kurds in Turkey103 – a population usually 
considered a minority rather than indigenous.104  
African jurisprudence also shows that subsistence could inform property rights beyond an 
indigenous context. In COHRE v. Sudan in 2009, the property rights of villagers in Darfur were 
threatened by government-orchestrated attacks from Janjaweed militias. The African 
Commission again drew from Doğan105 to support rights to traditional property ownership for 
this population: 
 
It doesn’t matter whether they [the complainants] had legal titles to the land, the fact that 
the victims cannot derive their livelihood from what they possessed for generations 
means they have been deprived of the use of their property under conditions which are 
not permitted by Article 14.106  
 
Similarly, in Nubian Community (2015), Nubian descendants of conscripts who settled in the 
outskirts of Nairobi in the early 1900s were found to be entitled to recognition of “at least some 
of the land as their communal property” despite a lack of formal title.107 Although not 
                                                 
103 Endorois, supra note 17, paras. 188-189. Doğan v. Turkey, Application Nos. 8803-8811/02, 8813/02 and 8815-
8819/02, 29 June 2004, ECtHR, Judgment, paras. 138-139, < 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%228813/02%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-61854%22]}>, 
visited 22 September 2018. 
104 See CESCR Concluding Observations, Turkey, 20 May 2011, E/C.12/TUR/CO/1, para. 10; HRC Concluding 
Observations, Turkey, 30 October 2012, CCPR/C/TUR/CO/1, para. 9.  
105 COHRE v. Sudan, supra note 45, paras. 195-201. 
106 Ibid., para. 205. 
107 Nubian Community in Kenya v. Kenya, Communication No. 317/2006, 28 February 2015, ACHPR, Decision, 
para. 160, <http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/17th-
eo/comunications/317.06/communication_317.06_eng.pdf>, visited 22 September 2018. 
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indigenous, the Commission supported communal rights from spiritual ties to the land, burial 
of the dead and the identity of the community,108 alongside security of tenure for individuals.109 
Jurisprudence from the Inter-American and African systems, therefore, points to a close and 
fluid relationship between the right to property and the peoples’ right to resources. In the Inter-
American system, peoples’ rights directly informed the right to property. In the African system 
the right to property provided the framework for the peoples’ right to resources. Moreover, the 
basis for a communal interpretation of property rights – necessity for the survival or subsistence 
of a community – is not just limited to an indigenous and tribal context but has a broader 
application. This is relevant for property rights under Article 1 of the Covenants. 
 
 
5. Property Rights under Article 1 of the Covenants 
 
The Inter-American Court’s use of Article 1 to interpret the right to property suggests that this 
Article has a more positive relationship with property rights than its drafting might suggest. 
Subsequent practice both by states in their reporting obligations and observations by the 
CESCR and HRC support this. Property rights inform Article 1 in four contexts: indigenous 
peoples; the general population; subsistence farmers and traditional land owners; and 
minorities. 
In evaluating this practice, it is important to first note a difference between the HRC and 
CESCR in practice on Article 1. In the ICCPR, rights relating to communities are divided 
between two articles: the collective right of peoples in Article 1 and the individually framed 
but communally contextualised right of persons belonging to minorities in Article 27. The 
                                                 
108 Ibid., para. 158 
109 Ibid., paras. 160-163. 
24 
 
division of labour between the Covenants, with the focus of the ICCPR on civil and political 
rights has meant that the HRC has had to address controversial political aspects of self-
determination under Article 1. As previously mentioned, the HRC has refused to consider 
Article 1 under Optional Protocol I, with communications over issues of land and resources 
being reconsidered under Article 27. 110 Likewise, in reporting, the HRC has tended to address 
rights to land and resources under Article 27 rather than Article 1.111 However, the distinction 
between ‘peoples’ and ‘minorities’ in the two Articles has also been ambiguous. The HRC 
distinguished the two, not by the groups they address, but the fact that Article 27 was held by 
individuals.112 It also considered Article 1 to be relevant for the interpretation of Article 27113 
and sometimes addressed the same issue under both rights114 suggesting that the reverse is true. 
This overlap means that HRC practice on Article 27 can be considered relevant for Article 1. 
The CESCR, by contrast, has a different relationship with Article 1. Although some rights in 
the ICESCR are particularly relevant to minorities, such as the right to culture in Article 15, 
there is no division of group rights like in the ICCPR. Moreover, the focus of the ICESCR has 
allowed the CESR to view its mandate as limited to the economic, social and cultural aspects 
of self-determination, which pose less of a threat to the integrity of states parties. How far the 
right can be limited in this way is questionable and has not yet been tested in communications. 
Economic interests and the distribution of wealth within states have often been central for 
secessionist movements, such as in Catalonia, and economic self-determination easily overlaps 
with a political right. Still, within these limits the CESCR has been much more assertive in 
                                                 
110 Poma Poma v. Peru, Communication No. 1457/2006, 27 March 2009, HRC, View, paras. 6.3 and 6.5, 
<http://juris.ohchr.org/Search/Details/1495>, visited 22 September 2018. 
111 See, e.g., HRC, Concluding Observations on Australia, 6 November 2017, UN Doc. CCPR/C/AUS/CO/6, 
paras. 51-52.  
112 HRC General Comment No. 23, supra note 39, para. 3.1. 
113 J. G. A. Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia (2000) Communication No. 760/1997, HRC, View, para. 10.3, 
<http://juris.ohchr.org/Search/Details/881>, visited 22 September 2018; Apirana Mahuika v. New Zealand, 
Communication No. 547/1993, 27 October 2000, HRC, View, para. 9.2 http://juris.ohchr.org/Search/Details/897, 
visited 24 September 2018. 
114 HRC, Concluding Observations on Mexico, 23 March 2010, UN Doc. CCPR/C/MEX/CO/5, para. 22. 
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addressing rights to land and resources for various communities under Article 1. Its Reporting 
Guidelines of 2008 specifically call on states to report under Article 1 on the protection of 
indigenous peoples’ ownership of territories or use of lands for traditional sources of livelihood, 
as well as processes for consultation and seeking prior informed consent.115 This has framed 
the discussion of indigenous property rights under Article 1 and subsequent committee practice 
has focussed more on these communities than any other. 
 
 
5.1 Indigenous Peoples 
 
The most extensive practice by the CESCR and HRC on property rights addresses indigenous 
peoples. The Committee has indicated standards over title, delimitation of territory and 
consultation in the event of interference with land and resources. 
Effective protection of property needs recognition of title, which also requires delimitation.116 
Inter-American jurisprudence has highlighted that while delimitation and legal recognition are 
essential for judicial protection of indigenous land rights under domestic law,117 the rights 
themselves are based on traditional possession.118 The CESCR has taken a similar instrumental 
approach to recognition and delimitation under Article 1(2).119 Demarcation and titling have 
been viewed as important for the effective protection of land rights but those lands are 
possessed “by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use.”120 The 
                                                 
115 CESCR, Guidelines on Treaty-Specific Documents to be Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 18 November 2009, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/2008/2, para. 8. 
116 CESCR Concluding Observations on Guatemala, 28 November 2014, UN Doc. E/C.12/GTM/CO/3, para. 6. 
117 Yakye Axa, supra note 66, para. 143. 
118 Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, 29 March 2006, IACtHR, Judgment, paras. 127-128, 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_146_ing.pdf, visited 24 September 2018. 
119 “[G]uarantee the right of indigenous peoples to dispose freely of their lands, territories and natural resources, 
by such means as providing legal recognition and the necessary legal protection.” CESCR Concluding 
Observations on Chile, 19 June 2015, UN Doc. E/C.12/CHL/CO/4, para. 8. 
120 CESCR Concluding Observations on Venezuela, 19 June 2015, UN Doc. E/C.12/VEN/CO/3, para. 9.  
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process for establishing title under Article 1 has been considered to require clear criteria and 
accessible mechanisms,121 while delimitation of territory should be conducted in consultation 
with the community.122  
Interference with property rights has been addressed under both Articles 1 and 27. However, 
as Article 27 has been the subject of communications, standards have received closer 
consideration under this article. Both Articles work within a framework of state sovereignty in 
which states have a right to regulate economic activity. A balance between states’ economic 
rights and the rights of minorities123 has been focused on by the HRC in the first instance on 
the notion of a threshold of interference. Actions with only a “limited impact”124 might not 
constitute interference, though activities can be considered cumulatively so that a series of 
small impacts and even future plans could cross the threshold.125  
Article 27 approaches property from the cultural rights of minorities. Article 1(2), by contrast, 
directly asserts the right of peoples to freely dispose of their resources.126 The CESCR has 
expanded on this, citing Article 26(2) of UNDRIP, that it is a right to “own, use, develop and 
control lands, territories and resources”.127 Nonetheless, the right is also relative as states are 
entitled to extract resources or make concessions to private companies for their extraction.128 
The standard the CESCR has used is whether activities negatively affect the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights.129 This again underlines the notion of a threshold of 
                                                 
121 CESCR Concluding Observations on Guyana, 9 October 2015, UN Doc. E/C.12/GUY/CO/2-4, paras. 14-16. 
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interference, though its contours are unclear, as it has not been elaborated in the same way as 
Article 27. 
Interference requires consultation and this process needs to be consistent and based on law 
rather than discretion.130 The elements in a consultation process have been addressed in 
concluding observations by the CESCR and HRC on Article 1 and in HRC jurisprudence on 
Article 27.  
The first is timing. The consultation must take place prior to the approval of potential acts,131 
but the CESCR in 2014 Concluding Observations on Guatemala emphasised the importance of 
“sufficient time and opportunity to reflect and take a decision”.132  
Second, it should be inclusive, reflecting the traditions and culture of a community133 and 
involve relevant indigenous institutions and key stakeholders.134 HRC jurisprudence on Article 
27 has engaged with differences in interests between a community as a whole and individuals 
within it or sections of that community.135 In Mahuika v. New Zealand the HRC considered 
that there needed to be “reasonable and objective justification” to distinguish the rights of 
particular individuals in a group from the group as a whole.136   
Third, it should be informed. The CESCR has identified the need for human rights and 
environmental impact assessment under Article 1(2)137 and the HRC in Poma Poma v. Peru 
                                                 
130 See CESCR Concluding Observations on Mexico, 29 March 2018, UN Doc. E/C.12/MEX/CO/5-6, paras. 12-
13; HRC Concluding Observations on Liberia, 23 July 2018, CCPR/C/LBR/CO/1, paras. 46-47. 
131 See Mahuika, supra note 113, para. 9.8. 
132 CESCR Concluding Observations, Guatemala, 28 November 2014, UN Doc. E/C.12/GTM/CO/3, para. 7. 
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found the failure of the state to require an independent impact assessment contributed to a 
violation of Article 27.138  
Fourth, it should be effective. The HRC in Äärelä and Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland found that the 
alteration of plans following a consultation complied with Article 27.139 Perhaps the most 
significant question for effectiveness, though, is the role of consent. In this area, the approach 
by both the CESCR and HRC to free, prior and informed consent has varied. The CESCR in 
some concluding observations has called for indigenous peoples to be consulted “with a view 
to obtaining their free, prior and informed consent”,140 which positions consent as a good faith 
aspiration, rather than a strict veto. However, in others it has called for states “to ensure that 
the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples is obtained”,141 which points to a 
stronger standard. The HRC in Poma Poma v. Peru elaborated that “effective” consultation 
“requires… the free, prior and informed consent of the members of the community”,142 though 
this was not actually applied as no consultation took place. In recent concluding observations 
it has referred to consultation “with a view to obtaining… free, prior and informed consent”.143  
The requirement for consent in this process could also be determined by protection of 
subsistence. This has been most notably expressed by the HRC in Poma Poma, which 
recognised the application of proportionality “so as not to endanger the very survival of the 
community and its members”.144 The precise role of this principle was ultimately not clarified, 
but it suggests the need for higher standards where activities have a greater impact on the 
subsistence of a community. This is consistent with Inter-American jurisprudence.145  
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5.2 Property Rights among the General Population 
 
Protection of means of subsistence and the derivation of a right to resources from property is 
not limited to indigenous peoples but can apply to the whole population of a state with special 
significance for vulnerable parts of it. This corresponds with CESCR General Comment No. 7 
on forced evictions, which has been cited by the Committee in concluding observations on 
Article 1146 and refers to the vulnerability of women, ethnic minorities and indigenous 
peoples.147 The vulnerability of a whole state’s people in its subsistence can be illustrated in 
the CESCR’s 2008 Concluding Observation on Nicaragua, in which it raised high levels of 
poverty and extreme poverty in the general population as an issue under Article 1(2).148 
The CESCR has raised property rights and their implications for subsistence under Article 1 on 
a number of occasions. In its 2015 Concluding Observations on Sudan it called on the state not 
to cede land to investors without conducting a human rights impact assessment and seeking 
community consent because of the dependency of those communities on land for their 
livelihood.149 This has not been limited to rural populations. In the case of the Map Ta Phut 
Industrial Estate, the Committee called for consultation with individuals and communities 
affected by the construction of Thailand’s largest industrial park.150  Vulnerability from the 
lack of protection of property rights may also be defined along gender lines. The CESCR in its 
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2015 Concluding Observations on Uganda highlighted the disproportionate effect of land-
grabbing on women.151  
States reports show substantial recognition for individual property rights in the implementation 
of Article 1.152 For example, Tanzania in its 2009 report to the CESCR stated that: 
 
[E]very person has the right to own or hold any property and to freely dispose of such 
property. The Constitution directs that it shall be unlawful for any person to be 
dispossessed of his property for purposes of nationalisation or any other expropriation 
unless it is done in accordance with the law which must provide for adequate, prompt and 
fair compensation.153 
 
                                                 
151 CESCR Concluding Observations on Uganda, 19 June 2015, UN Doc. E/C.12/UGA/CO/1, paras. 12 and 14. 
See also HRC, Concluding Observations on Liberia, 23 July 2018, UN Doc. CCPR/C/LBR/CO/1, para. 47. 
152 Before the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights see: Chile, Third Periodic Report 2003, UN 
Doc. E/1994/104/Add.26, para. 52; Malta, Initial Report 2003, UN Doc. E/1990/5/Add.58, para. 4; Latvia, Initial 
Report 2005, UN Doc. E/1990/5/Add.70, para. 8; Nepal Second Periodic Report 2006, UN Doc. E/C.12/NPL/2, 
para. 96; Kazakhstan, Initial Report 2007, UN Doc. E/C.12/KAZ/1, para. 115; Madagascar, Second Periodic 
Report 2007, UN Doc. E/C.12/MDG/2, para. 131; Cambodia, Initial Report 2008, UN Doc. E/C.12/KHM/1, para. 
71; Mauritania, Initial Report 2009, UN Doc. E/C.12/MRT/1, para. 135; Tanzania, Initial, Second and Third 
Periodic Report 2009, UN Doc. E/C.12/TZA/1-3, para. 30; Kuwait, Second Periodic Report 2010, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/KWT/2, para. 59; Mexico, Fifth and Sixth Periodic Reports 2012, UN Doc. E/C.12/MEX.5-6, para. 3; 
Burundi, Initial Report 2013, UN Doc. E/C.12/BDI/1, para. 42; Angola, Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports 2014, 
UN Doc. E/C.12/AGO/4-5, para. 18; Burkina Faso, Initial Report 2015, UN Doc. E/C.12/BFA/1, para. 43; Cape 
Verde, Initial Report 2017, UN Doc. E/C.12/CPV/1, para. 10. 
Before the Human Rights Committee see: Costa Rica, Fourth Periodic Report 1998, UN Doc. CCPR/C/103/Add.6, 
paras. 2-4; Georgia, Second Periodic Report 2000, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GEO/2000/2, para. 34; Togo, Report 2001, 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/TGO/2001/3, para. 59; El Salvador, Third Periodic Report 2002, UN Doc. 
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Likewise, Angola in its 2014 report to the CESCR on Article 1 referred to constitutional 
amendments that improved implementation of the ICESCR, which included, first of all, 
recognition of the right to property.154 Liberia in its 2016 report to the HRC referred to the 
importance of land rights for its post-conflict security, and detailed under Article 1 legislation 
to recognise and delimit public, government, customary and private property.155 This 
widespread reporting strongly suggests that respect for property rights is an important element 
in the implementation of Article 1, even if specific standards in these national systems differ. 
The conditions for interference with property rights have also been considered in observations 
by the CESCR and HRC. The most systematic requirement has been for property rights to be 
addressed in a legal framework, with effective enforcement through courts.156 Public purpose 
as a basis for expropriation has sometimes been raised.157 A significant trend is the growing 
support from both the CESCR and HRC behind the standard of ‘adequate’ compensation,158 
which would be in line with regional bodies. This corresponds with CESCR General Comment 
No. 7, on forced evictions, which supports adequate compensation as an effective remedy for 
deprivation of property.159 Elaborating on the concept, the CESCR has specified that 
compensation “should be commensurate with the actual value of the land”,160 though this could 
allow for other factors to affect a valuation. The committees have also recognised other forms 
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5.3 Subsistence Farmers and Traditional Land Rights 
 
Subsistence farmers and people with land rights rooted in traditional custom form part of a 
state’s people with particular vulnerability over their means of subsistence.163 This wider 
protection of subsistence under Article 1(2) can be seen in the CESCR’s General Comment No. 
15, which addressed access to water for both subsistence farmers and indigenous peoples under 
Article 1(2).164  The position of subsistence farmers and traditional property owners has been 
raised both by the CESCR and states parties in their reports under Article 1. For example, the 
CESCR in its Concluding Observations on Sudan in 2015 raised the impact of development 
projects on small-scale farmers and agropasturalists and urged legal recognition of their 
customary tenure.165 Similarly, in states’ reports, Côte d’Ivoire in its 2013 report to the HRC 
addressed allocation of title to customary land owners,166 while Cambodia in 2012 referred to 
its programme to confer title to persons possessing land without documentation.167 Burkina 
Faso in its 2015 report raised its law on rural land tenure, which it noted applied to “nomadic 
                                                 
161 HRC Concluding Observations on Liberia, 23 July 2018, UN Doc. CCPR/C/LBR/CO/1 para. 47. 
162 CESCR General Comment No. 24, 10 August 2017, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/24, para. 17; HRC Concluding 
Observations on Liberia, 23 July 2018, UN Doc. CCPR/C/LBR/CO/1 para. 47. 
163 Final Study of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee on the Advancement of the Rights of Peasants 
and Other People Working in Rural Areas, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/75, 24 February 2012, 4-8. 
164 CESCR General Comment No. 15, supra note 62, para. 7. 
165 CESCR Concluding Observations on Sudan, 9 October 2015, UN Doc. E/C.12/SDN/CO/2, para. 11. See also 
CESCR Concluding Observations on Uganda, 19 June 2015, UN Doc. E/C.12/UGA/CO/1, paras. 12 and 14; 
CESCR Concluding Observations on Niger, 29 March 2018, UN Doc. E/C.12/NER/CO/1, para. 17. 
166 Cote d’Ivoire, Initial Report 2013, UN Doc. CCPR/C/CIV/1, paras. 43-44. 
167 Cambodia, Second Periodic Report 2012, UN Doc. CCPR/C/KHM/2, para. 32. 
33 
 
shepherd” communities, such as the Fulani and Tuareg, though it denied they were indigenous 
peoples, “strictly speaking”.168  
The CESCR has also referred under Article 1 to recognition of customary land tenure of 
peasants and smallholders in the non-binding FAO Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible 
Governance of Tenure 2012.169 Similar recognition is expressed in the draft UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Peasants,170 which calls on states to “take appropriate measures to provide legal 
recognition for land tenure rights, including customary tenure rights, not currently protected by 
law.”171 This declaration also calls for consultations where natural resources traditionally held 
or used by peasants are interfered with,172 though this does not require free, prior and informed 
consent.173 In addition, it prohibits arbitrary deprivation of land and access to resources.174 
However, its commentary notes that while this protects persons with recognised title, it does 
not necessarily help forms of traditional property that differ from an individual property 
model.175 Nonetheless, communities with similar vulnerabilities to indigenous peoples can be 
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Ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities are another section of a state’s people with particular 
vulnerabilities. As the boundaries of indigeneity vary between regions177 and are contested by 
states, other populations can have similar characteristics to indigenous peoples. The Inter-
American Court, in particular, developed communal property rights based on Article 1 for the 
Saramaka, Kalina and Lokono as ‘tribal’, rather than indigenous peoples. Tribal peoples had 
“similar social, cultural, and economic characteristics” to indigenous peoples and this creates 
an even greater overlap with minorities.178 Minorities could rely on subsistence agriculture for 
a livelihood; have a tradition of customary land ownership; have a close connection between 
land and culture; and experience marginalisation. For example, the CESCR in its Concluding 
Observations on Thailand in 2015 expressed concern about enjoyment of “traditional individual 
and communal rights by ethnic minorities in their ancestral lands” under Article 1, without 
characterising them as ‘indigenous’.179  
Another vulnerability of minorities could come from their relationship with an ethnic majority 
government or from ethnic conflict within a state, which often centres on the distribution of 
land and resources. The CESCR in its 2015 observations on Iraq addressed the land rights of 
the Assyrian minority under Article 1. This specifically related to the conflict in north of the 
country, which involved competing claims between different ethnic and religious groups over 
land. In this case, the Kurdish regional government had expropriated Assyrian property, which 
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included both individual and communal ownership,180 and failed to implement court rulings on 
its return.181  
It must be noted, though, that this examination of minorities under Article 1 has been relatively 
rare. The association of minorities with Article 1 has been controversial as it carries 
connotations of secession or at least economic balkanisation within a state and despite their 
overlap with indigenous peoples, minorities have not received the same level of attention. 




This article has looked at how property rights have defined the peoples’ right to dispose of 
resources and protection of their means of subsistence under Article 1(2) of the Covenants. It 
has shown how the peoples’ right to resources can draw from concepts of property, whether 
individual, communal or public. Article 1(2) has developed through a pairing of a peoples’ right 
to dispose of resources and the protection of their means of subsistence. Property rights feed 
into the right to resources, with the protection of subsistence not only defining this connection 
but also addressing the effects of the failure to respect those rights on food, water, housing, 
livelihood and culture. 
A major focus in the development of a right to resources has been on indigenous peoples but it 
is also clear that other vulnerable communities and sections of a population also fall within the 
scope of Article 1. The common feature of ‘peoples’ addressed under the Article is that they 
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are states’ peoples or sections of that people with vulnerabilities over subsistence. This is also 
true for indigenous peoples whose rights still fall within the framework of state sovereignty.182 
The vulnerability of indigenous peoples over their subsistence and access to land and resources 
is shared by small-scale farmers, pastoralists and traditional land users, ethnic minorities and 
women. These vulnerabilities over subsistence and property rights are not restricted to any 
particular group, even if the main focus of reporting is likely to continue to be on indigenous 
peoples. 
If a right of peoples to dispose of resources and protection of their subsistence is to be more 
than just rhetorical its needs to be attached to specific standards. Subsistence could provide a 
focus for individual property violations to be considered a breach of Article 1(2), in contexts 
such as land-grabbing183 and forced evictions,184 which have been raised by the CESCR under 
Article 1. Standards over the deprivation of property are still developing in the practice of the 
committees. Accordance with law would correspond with the prohibition of arbitrary 
deprivation, but increasing practice from the CESCR and HRC behind ‘adequate 
compensation’ is a significant trend. The practice behind this form of compensation is still not 
extensive and the contours of ‘adequate’ have not been refined, but it would bring the 
Covenants in line with regional human rights instruments. Protection of subsistence appears to 
inject proportionality into restrictions on property rights, but this principle raised in Poma Poma 
needs further exploration in observations and communications. Consultation is also an element. 
The role of consent in this process has varied in an indigenous context and is weaker outside it, 
though standards may vary in relation to subsistence. Nonetheless, this relationship still needs 
further clarification. 
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Ultimately, the peoples’ right to resources and protection of subsistence in Article 1(2) can 
provide security to vulnerable sections of a state’s people and underpin the protection of other 
rights in the Covenants. An interpretation of Article 1(2) tied to subsistence is one of minimum 
guarantees rather than wider rights. Nevertheless, as the HRC has shown with its caution over 
Article 1, the right to resources could be most effective, where it is limited to tangible effects 
on groups of individuals, rather than being drawn into difficult questions about the structure of 
states. 
 
 
 
 
